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LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY 
ETHICS CENTER 
Humphry and Takken 
Debate California 
Death Initiative 
Active euthanasia was the subject of 
an all-day debate sponsored by the Loma 
Linda University Ethics Center during 
LLU's recent Alumni Postgraduate Con-
vention. Opposing points of view were 
presented by Derek Humphry, founder 
and executive director of the Hemlock 
Society, and Teresa Takken, founder 
and director of the Pacific Institute for 
Ethics and Education in the Life Sci-
ences. At issue was California's "Hu-
mane and Dignified Death Initiative." The 
riebate was videotaped by camera crews 
om the National Broadcasting 
Company's news department for use in 
a national television program. 
The seminar began with a review of 
the historical and ethical settings of the 
initiative by Loma Linda University's 
Gerald Winslow. Takken expressed her 
reservations regarding the initiative in a 
formal lecture, after which Humphry 
presented a brief in its behalf. Humphry 
and Takken then debated the initiative 
and responded to questions from the 
doctors, nurses and ethicists who had 
gathered for the day's activities in the 
Campus Chapel. 
According to Humphry, the essence of 
the instrument is that it would "enable a 
patient who is dying in an unbearable 
manner to request in writing that the 
treating physician administer to him or 
her an overdose of a lethal drug, either 
orally or intravenously." 
Takken, an American nun who has 
served and studied in Holland for many 
years, and Humphry, an English atheist 
who now resides in Southern California, 
differed regarding many issues. Their 
disagreements were sharpest regarding 
the relationships between: (1) religion 
ld morality, (2) suffering and virtue, (3) 
..;ausing death and allowing it, (4) individ-
ual freedom and the common good, and 
(5) current practices in the United States 
and policies in Holland. 
LLU Schedules Clinical Ethics 
Seminar for 1989 
A program of intensive study in the 
clinical aspects of biomedical ethics is 
planned for the winter quarter of 1989 at 
Loma Linda University. Known as the 
Clinical Intensive in Biomedical Eth ics 
(CIBE), the program is being organized 
and sponsored by the School of Religion's 
Department of Christian Ethics in coop-
eration with LLU 's School of Medicine, 
the Center for Christian Bioethics, and 
the Medical Center. The purpose of 
CIBE is to provide an introduction to 
issues of biomedical ethics within the 
clinical setting. 
The eight-week program is planned 
for an interdisciplinary group of profes-
sionals and students of professions 
whose present or anticipated responsi-
bilities require a knowledge of, biomedi-
cal ethics. A group of eight to twelve 
persons representing such fields as 
medicine, nursing, allied health profes-
sions, law, philosophy, ministry, social 
work, and health care administration will 
be selected. Eight units of graduate 
credit will be available to the participants 
who desire it. For further information 
write to Professor Gerald Winslow, the 
program's director, at the Loma Linda 
University Ethics Center. 
Jack Provonsha Lectureship 
Inaugurated at A.P.C. 
A new series of annual lectures that 
honors and extends the contributions of 
Dr. Jack W. Provonsha to LLU's School 
of Medicine was inaugurated during the 
1988 Alumni Postgraduate Convention . 
Norman J. Woods, president of LLU, 
introduced the series and Dr. Provon-
sha, the first lecturer, to those who 
crowded into the Randall Visitors Center 
on Tuesday evening, March 8. The title 
of Dr. Provonsha's presentation was 
"Checking the Foundations: The Moral 
Presuppositions of the Practice of Medi-
cine Revisited." 
President Woods announced that the 
Jack Provonsha lecturer in 1989 will be 
Dr. Edmund Pellegrino, a physician and 
philosopher who now serves as the di-
rector of Georgetown University's Ken-
nedy Institute of Biomedical and Repro-
ductive Ethics. 
The purpose of the Provonsha Lec-
tureship is to introduce to those attend-
ing the Annual Postgraduate Conven-
tion the ideas of physicians who are also 
accomplished moral philosophers or 
theologians. The series is co-sponsored 
by LLU's Ethics Center and by the Alumni 
Association of the university's School of 
Medicine. 
Dr. Provonsha, the physician and 
philosopher for whom the series is 
named, taught medical ethics and phi-
losophy of religion with distinction at LLU 
for more than a quarter of a century. He 
was educated at Pacific Union College, 
Loma Linda University, Harvard Univer-
sity and Claremont Graduate School. 
Dr. Provonsha was the Ethics Center's 
first director. He continues to serve as 
chairman of the Center's Board of Direc-
tors even though he has "retired" in the 
state of Washington to give his full time 
to writing and lecturing. His wife Marga-
ret is also a physician. 
ETHICS AND OLD AGE 
by Joseph Fletcher 
University of Virginia 
Those who follow different drums often meet anyway, 
transiently, at one point or another along their different 
paths. Take, for example, the question about old age and 
when we have lived long enough. 
I have just read 'a new book which contends that ethically 
there should be a limit on life-prolonging medical care 
because there are too many people who live well beyond 
the biblical "three score years and ten," and the cost of 
keeping them alive unjustly deprives younger people. 
In my own case I, too, have believed that there should be 
a limit on the life span, but I came to it by way of biological 
reasoning in the indicative mood, not as a principle of social 
ethics in the imperative mood. Exploring possible ways to 
prolong human lives by genetic and biochemical strategies, 
I realized in the course of my investigation that our brain 
cells, unlike all the other cells in our bodies, die off without 
any capacity to regenerate. This being the case, whatever 
means might be found to prolong human lives would have 
a negative consequence. It would lead to a massive 
population of senile old people. 
According to classical anatomy, we are born with a given 
number of brain cells. Whether they are wiped out by injury, 
disease, or old age, they are finished off never to be 
replaced. Tissue transplants and implants into brains, 
recent innovations, do not change the facts, however 
promising they may be, for tentative use therapeutically. If 
and when treatments using adrenal and fetal tissue trans-
plants become clinically feasible they might, perhaps, hold 
out hope for victims of maladies such as Alzheimer and 
Parkinson's disease. 
The "Iongevitists" were not facing up to a serious limit 
already set on living, set objectively de rerum nature, in the 
nature of things-at least if the quality of life as well as its 
quantity is taken into account. At the age of 40, Dr. Sam 
Johnson in his Vanities of Human Wishes(1749) observed, 
"Life protracted is protracted woe." In the eighteenth 
century even at the age of 40 people were already faced 
with the problems of health not reached in the twentieth 
century until they are 60 years old. Johnson, at the 
relatively early age of 40, had begun to know what a New 
Hampshire farmer had in mind when he told me recently 
that "old age ain't for sissies." 
For all his storied brilliance Dr. Sam knew nothing of brain 
physiology,'nor did he ever imagine or foresee how modern 
hygiene and public health practices were going to add to 
2 the average life span. Now in the twentieth century people 
75 to 84 have increased by eleven times; those 85 and older 
have increased by twenty times. Only now do people age; 
they used to die. Added to the general longevity was 
something else Johnson was unable to foresee-the "pro-
tracting" capabilities of modern resuscitative medicine. In 
short, he had no inkling of the social and economic pres-
sures which now amplify the personal and medical prob-
lems of living too long. 
Sir George Pickering, Regius Professor of Medicine at 
Oxford in the 1970s, being biologically oriented, drew the 
ethical conclusion that longevity research would result in an 
increased population of people with young bodies and 
senescent minds; it was to him a terrifying prospect and he 
considered it wrong. Imagine for yourself a new technology 
that is able to provide youth for people who would fall victim 
to Alzheimer's disease. 
The neurologist Lord Brain argued that research into pro-
longing human life should not be stopped or foregone 
because if we cannot foresee all of the consequences of 
making new discoveries, which is true enough, then we 
cannot foresee of a certainty what will be the consequences 
of not making new discoveries. Brain was casting aside 
any rational or prudent limits on new knowledge and know-
how. He absolutized knowledge as if it is intrinsically and 
always good, always desirable, urging a kind of know-
nothing or blind approach to research and investigation, a 
if it is good for its own sake. 
"The whole thrust of his reasoning is 
that we oldsters (I am myself an 
octogenarian) have a moral obliga-
tion to die. " 
Such a posture is impossible for those whose ethical 
appraisals are carried out consequentially, that is, by 
projecting the probable effects of any course of action, 
weighing up the good and bad, the desirable and undesir-
able. Not to set limits means in effect not to have significant 
values. Not to foresee the results of such a technological 
innovation as induced longevity when it is foreseeably of 
negative value and thereby irrational is tantamount to 
rejecting any moral limits on knowledge. 
The consequential method of reasoning (call it prudential 
if you prefer) is the one used by Daniel Callahan in his new 
volume Setting Limits: Medical Goals in an Aging Society 
(Simon and Schuster, 1987), already mentioned. He 
foresees that resuscitation and even less crucial forms of 
medical treatment can prolong the woes of old people. He 
does not single out senescence as a problem. His reason-
ing is based on a broad range of demographic considera-
tions, social and economic. On these grounds he appeal' 
to us to recognize how negative the consequences are ( 
extending human lives, and expensive. He recommends 
that we set limits in the quantity and duration of human lives, 
for the sake of both the quality of life for the elderly and out 
of distributive justice to the whole population. His rejection 
of utilitarianism in theory is well known, but in practice he 
shows us that nonetheless he is as consequential in his 
ethical appraisal of the problem as John Stuart Mill ever 
~hought of being . I find no fault with him on this score, none 
r( )1t all. 
Callahan has long been aware, keenly aware, of the 
finiteness of human values and human goals. In The 
Tyranny of Survival (1973) he made this plain, in terms that 
were often too sharp to be enjoyed by simplistic futurists-
the sort who automatically applaud all innovations as such, 
as Lord Brain did with his "Let's do it and then see what 
happens." Tyranny was written more than fifteen years 
ago and even then Callahan used population growth (and 
along with it genetic innovations) as an instance of the need 
to carefully count the costs. He was suggesting even then 
that we set limits on medicine's technological capabilities. 
His new 1987 work is rather heuristic; setting limits is 
focused solely on the ethics of population growth and its 
demographics. His thinking is keyed more to future condi-
tions as he projects them than to the present. 
In Tyranny he said explicitly that "limits" mean No! It 
means setting boundaries beyond which we should be 
forbidden to go. At the same time, however, he felt that the 
rational case ethically for limiting population has little or no 
chance of being accepted widely enough to have any 
cultural and therefore political force, thus in effect underlin-
ing his own proposal. 
Now in Setting Limits Callahan is more draconian but no 
more optimistic. He foresees that to try to limit life-
extending medical care for the elderly would result not only 
in a conflict of conscience but in blackmarket practices, 
,~uch like what followed passage of the Eighteenth Amend-
)nent prohibiting alcoholic drinks. People would violate 
/ both legal statutes and moral principles in order to stay 
alive, just as they did to get a cocktail or highbaU. Nonethe-
less, he questions the notion of long life, as such, in effect 
inviting us to face the question whether the old do not after 
all have a moral obligation to die-for the sake of distribu-
tive justice. 
Setting aside the practical difficulties as unsolvable Cal-
lahan turns to the imperative mood, to what should be, 
apart from can or could be. He examines the demographics 
of old age-their increasing numbers, the escalating cost of 
their care and treatment, the built-in inevitable loss of 
function and/or quality in their lives, as well as the fact that 
supporting the old deprives the growing young of needed 
funds. Perhaps the most questionable of several question-
able assumptions in his book is that society will not be able 
economically to provide the elderly with full medical care. 
All of this poses searching ethical questions. What pre-
cisely is the moral obligation of the children or their neigh-
bors to preserve them? On what grounds does it rest? 
Such questions of moral philosophy are, alas, not exam-
ined critically in Callahan's book. Instead, he turns to social 
ethics, to generalizations about the obligations of govern-
ment and its fiscal policies. As he sees it, a rational study 
of the problem leads to the guideline (in my words, not his) 
that the public purse ought to be open to help all people of 
all ages to live out a natural or normal life span, but not 
oeyond that. 
.) The helpable years, as he seems to see it, end when we 
become septuagenarians or, if not then, when we become 
octogenarians or "nonegenarians." When the cut-off point 
is reached, he thinks, the elderly ought to be given comfort 
care but no more treatment if it is so expensive it uses up 
scarce or limited resources needed by younger people. 
Callahan never says it in so many words but the whole 
thrust of his reasoning is that we oldsters (I am myself an 
octogenarian) have a moral obligation to die-an obligation 
based on distributive justice and a cost-benefit calculation. 
"Survival is a 'gut' matter; distribu-
tive justice is an abstract principle, 
much weaker motivationally. " 
This position is for most people a much harder one to take 
than the one lying behind the right-to-die movement. The 
right to choose to die rather than suffer further treatment, 
especially in terminal illnesses, is implicit in the decriminali-
zation of suicide and explicit in statute law which is on the 
books in thirty-nine states of the Union and the District of 
Columbia. Their position is a far cry from claiming that if 
people are elderly they ought to die whether they want to or 
not, as a matter of social obligation. The difference is 
between saying we "may" choose death and we "ought" to 
choose it. 
The right-to-die movement poses a microethical problem 
on a one-by-one choice basis of decision making, but what 
Callahan is talking about is macroethical, on the basis of 
impersonal demographic data and a sense of social justice. 
It is this difference between being free as an individual to 
choose to die, on the one hand, and being morally obliged 
to die, on the other, which makes the demographic basis so 
radical-that makes it such a wrenching break from the 
conventional wisdom. 
Advocates of the right-to-die will not automatically or 
quickly turn into ought-to~die advocates. Far from it. Even 
if they endorse it as a principle of social ethics they will fall 
back from acting on it, especially in cases where the lives 
of their own parents or kin are at stake. The general run of 
people love being alive too much to give it up, no matter 
what they may th ink logically about the "tyranny" of the wish 
to survive. They may gladly give life up when the flame is 
no longer worth the candle, when it's better to be dead, but 
not for reasons of abstract social justice. 
Survival is a "gut" matter; distributive justice is an abstract 
principle, much weaker motivationally. Survival is an 
instinctual demand and, indeed, the fundamental dynamic 
of the evolutionary process, whereas principles of social 
justice are only matters of intellectual or rational reflection. 
As a question of philosophy I am convinced, as Callahan is, 
that personal morality is properly spelled out within the 
context of social ethics. Moreover, we (he and I) agree that 
the social interest has priority over private interests-if and 
when they come into tension or conflict. Hence, the prin-
ciple of eminent domain in the law, for example. The case 
for not extending the life of older people may be strong 
cerebrally, but it is not strong "intentionally." It is therefore 
without cultural or popular force. 
The human gut often subverts reason . Time after time, 
to wit, I have heard physicians say, "Yes, the case for 
bringing a patient's life to an end when he or she wants it to 
be ended, in certain situations, is logically right, but I just 
'feel' that when it came right down to the wire I couldn't do 
it." This lack of union between mind and feeling could well 3 
have been one reason behind Oscar Wilde's assertion in 
Phrases and Philosophies for the Use of the Young (1884), 
"Any preoccupation with ideas of right and wrong shows an 
4 
arrested development"-although he would have better 
said "impractical" than "arrested." 
The media and popular press, not only scientific journals, 
often give a fairly realistic picture of the facts about popu-
lation pressure and its social ills. For our purposes here, the 
following data indicate why the elderly increasingly pose an 
urgent problem. We in the United States spent over $80 
billion out of general and private funds on health care for the 
old in 1981. By the year 2000 that is expected to be $200 
billion. In the past twenty years the percentage of federal 
funds, not to speak of state and local, rose from 15 percent 
to 28 percent-nearly doubled. The population between 65 
and 80 years of age is now greater than the population 
under 18. Since the turn of this century people over 65 have 
increased their numbers more than eightfold. 
Those over 85 are the fastest-growing age group in 
America. The age level 75-84 was eleven times greater 
than it was in 1900. Life expectancy has moved up from 60 
years in 1930 to 76 years in 1984. Increasing longevity 
carries with it an increasing rate of chronic and acute 
illnesses. Health care costs for the elderly alone were 40 
percent of the federal budget for health care in 1984, and 
this is expected to go up to 60 percent by the year 2024. In 
the same period there are projected increases for those 
over 65 of 157 percent in physician visits, 278 percent in 
nursing home residents, and 159 percent in personal 
health payments (in constant dollars). 
Here, then, in measurement terms, is the basic picture. 
As Garrett Hardin says in his Filters Against-Folly (1986), 
we have to be numerate as well as literate to understand 
our problems. Demography gives us plenty of reason for 
concern with the old-age population. It shows us why 
"going on living" can be not onlya burden for individuals and 
their families but for society too. Hence, the question: Does 
not medicine in particular and society as a whole have to 
back off and ask whether-as the Bible puts it-there isn't 
a time to plant and a time to pluck, a time to live and a time 
to die? Not only in particular cases of personal choice, as 
in voluntary euthanasia and the exercise of our rights under 
living will laws, but in principle as a general policy. 
When I put together the two points already made-(1) 
that there is a general human aversion to dying even in the 
"old old" (75 plus) and (2) that death is sooner or later 
welcome for the sake of some individuals themselves as 
well as in the common interest-the result is, I think, a sharp 
turn away from Callahan's treatment of the question. I am 
not antipodal altogether to his concern about the numbers 
side of the question, but I want to propose that human lives 
should always end, short of nature's final mandate, as a 
voluntary choice and never as an imposition on unwilling 
persons. Put bluntly, we should not try to deal with the 
problem by allocating and limiting medical care to the 
elderly. 
Even to toy with the thought of doing so reveals an 
inordinate scheme of values, a value system gone awry, a 
distorted pondering of what we prize and value. It fails to 
render our obligations to our elderly parents and neighbors 
the high-order value they should have. A test of our 
humanity is what we are willing to sacrifice for them. They 
are disadvantaged through no fault of their own, even 
though some of them might be culpable in part because of 
their habits and life style. 
I propose, therefore, that we drop the idea that we can or 
should apply the concept of moral obligation for the cate-
gory "old age." Let us apply it instead to cases. In short, we 
ought to decide whether there is an obligation to die in terms 
of particular individuals in particular situations, not in terms 
of generalized categories of human beings. 
This, of course, is the approach of situation ethics. 
Situation ethics is, as Webster-Merriam defines it, a "sys-
tem" of ethics "based on love '" by which acts are judge 
wtthin their context instead of by categorical principles.' 
When the families and physicians of our old men and 
women perceive that life has become irreversibly a sore 
burden for them, then out of loving concern let them "go" by 
stopping treatment and withholding resuscitative meas-
ures and artificial medical life-support systems-in short, 
welcome death. 
Only if the patient is hopelessly incompetent and no 
longer able himself to choose for or against dying should we 
decide for him. This is what the courts call "substituted 
judgment," and even in such cases it's still really the 
patient's own choice, reasonably presumed. 
Putting it bluntly, we should be case-centered, not rule-
centered. Let us hope we will never adopt an undiscrimi-
nating age limit, such as the British National Health Service 
once set de facto on renal dialysis for patients over 55, 
although without any formally stated policy or provision in 
the law. The practice ended because England's elderly 
protested vigorously, as well as their friends in the younger 
generations. Even the Eskimos used to let their decrepit 
elderly go out of the igloo in freezing weather to die by 
hypothermia, often said to be a "good way to go." This was 
on a diagnostic basis, not a birthdate basis. 
I can, I believe, take comfort in the knowledge that 
patients and their families, like people in general, are open 
more and more to giving death a welcome. I recall how old 
Dr. Logan Clendendenning once remarked that the natura' 
world blundered on to the form of energy called life bl! 
having so blundered, if there is any creative intelligence 
behind it all, death was ' "a real stroke of genius" (The 
Human Body, 1941). 
"Society should be willing to spend all 
that is needed for the elderly's medical 
needs. " 
The statistic and demographic data, even in terms of a lay 
grasp, is already generating changes in popular sentiment. 
Out of a combination of rational self-regard and loving 
concern for the sick and old, we see that families, physi-
cians and patients themselves are pulling out of the old 
outmoded notion that life is an absolute value or end in itself 
and that dying is outside any human initiatives-taboo and 
untouchable. Quality of life steadily transcends the abso-
lutism of the "sanctity" of life doctrine. 
We should continue to provide the funds for medical care 
of the old even though it uses up resources we could have 
used for other things. We should provide it as a matter of 
love and loyalty, not as a "sacrifice," revising if necessary 
the way we rank-order our relative values. The "squeeze" 
of medical costs for the elderly which falls on younger 
people will constantly be lightened by the elderly them-
selves, as they exercise their right to die. Our ability to 
improve cost-effectiveness can help. 
Americans like to think America is "the richest country i. 
the world," and whether that is true or not we surely are rich 
enough to keep our parents alive as long as they wish to be, 
even though we may have to cut down or out not only what 
is spent on luxuries but even reallocate whatever seems to 
fall into the class of "needs" and desirables. The young and 
the old are partners, not rivals. An age war is a paranoic 
scenario. 
On this principle nobody's death will come as a matter of 
( 'locial-economic policy. The elderly will die voluntarily 
(ather than because medical help was r~fused them. And 
at the same time we can hope and even foresee that more 
and more of the decrepit will choose to die out of respect for 
their own quality of life. 
There are very few physicians who value human lives ab-
solutely rather than relatively. Dr. Howard Spiro of the Yale 
School of Medicine recently listed some of the questions 
being asked in medical circles. "What disabilities of old age 
do we repair? At what cost? ... Do. we try to repair all 
defects that lead to death? Only those that lead to a bad 
death? ... Only recently have we begun to wonder whether 
it is always prudent to do whatever can be done. How much 
does society, all of us really, want to spend on the old and 
sick~ That issue lies behind most of the ferment in medicine. 
Just as important, how much do the old want of the 
ministrations of medicine?" (The Paros, Alpha Omega 
Alphas National Medical Honors Society, 51 [Winter, 
1988]:19-23). 
On the groundwork I have outlined, we should repair 
disabilities only if the patient chooses treatment, and only 
after a careful assessment has been made and interpreted 
to the patient of how much promise it gives of continued 
quality of life. We should be clinically realistic; physicians 
should be candid with all involved, but willing to treat except 
where it is patently useless. Society should be willing to 
spend all that is needed for the elderly's medical needs. 
The free and competent consent should be all we require 
or either treating them or withholding treatment. 
All this adds up to dropping any notion of setting imper-
sonal and categorical limits on medical treatment for the 
aged. It turns us instead to a policy of respect for the aged's 
choice, doing all we can meanwhile to encourage a choice 
of death whenever it is in the patient's own best interest. By 
this route we will avoid giving what somebody recently 
called a bumpersticker answer to a bubblegum question. 
I think of the recent news regarding organ transplant 
cutbacks in Oregon. It underlines the lack of realism in any 
proposal to cut back medical treatment for the elderly. 
Oregon's legislature last year voted against public assis-
tance for heart, liver, and bone marrow transplants. Be-
cause kidney and cornea transplants are less expensive 
and more successful, a majority voted for them. Statistics 
showed that 400,000 of Oregon's 2.6 million people-
young, middle-aged, and old-had no health insurance. It 
was learned that 1500 pregnant women could have prena-
tal care for what it would cost to pay for only 30 of the 
excluded transplants. A majority of the legislature decided 
that to be fair they both have to limit funds and allocate on 
a need basis. 
The legislative vote showed a concern for distributive 
justice, the greatest good for the greatest number, but 
would a majority also have favored cutting out people 
because they were old-or black or born of naturalized 
parents or because they had no high school diploma-or 
~ny other such category of people? Of course not. In a 
Jemocratic society cost-benefit analyses and success rates 
are relevant in deciding whether to treat individuals in 
individual situations, but not categorical discriminations. 
Physicians accept the reality and inevitability of death. It 
takes very little clinical experience to learn the desirability 
in certain situations of stopping treatment if that is the 
patient's wish, or a surrogate's. The common law has 
always regarded involuntary treatment as a tort. The 
courts, especially at the appellate level, constantly uphold 
the right of all patients to choose to die by stopping 
treatment for sufficient rational cause. Resuscitation and 
medical life-support systems are being turned off every day 
in our hospitals. 
Facing the problems posed by a steadily increasing 
population of elderly people, we will have to face the fact 
that "stopping treatment" really means ending the lives of 
those who exercise their right to die voluntarily. To avoid 
ending the lives of senior citizens en bloc by the indirect 
strategy of limiting funds for their medical care we should, 
as I propose, turn to a plan of voluntary living and dying for 
the old. Let me offer a description of what it will mean, not 
in legal terms but in terms of basic ethical principles. 
Causing people to die-whether young, middle-aged, 
old, or old old-is repugnant. In the case of the elderly, if 
their numbers cost the rest of us more than it used to cost, 
we shall meet the problem by a new allocation of funds, 
perhaps entailing a cut in other things and even a revised 
definition of "need" and "luxury." As to medical costs in 
particular we will not try to eliminate the elderly by indirect 
maneuvers such as limiting funds for care and treatment.* 
Categorical discriminations for the purpose of reducing 
the numbers of the old are unethical. Patients of any age 
are persons. In a genuine democracy the Kantian principle 
is basic-persons are ends in themselves, not means to the 
ends of others. Our social ethics allocates common re-
sources on the principle of equal worth and our personal 
resources on the principles of loving concern, loyalty, and 
gratitude. 
Our cultural attitude toward dying by choice becomes 
more favorable all the time. Between 1973 and 1985 those 
Americans who oppose euthanasia fell from 52 percent to 
35 percent, according to a poll by Louis Harris and Associ-
ates; those favoring rose from 38 percent to 62 percent. 
This is really active euthanasia, not passive. It does not 
wait for death to come. The ethical assumption is that 
patients in such straits are terminally ill, but "terminal" is a 
loose word meaning hopelessly ill. The courts are still 
conflicted. On one hand they uphold the principle of self-
determination and the personal freedom to stop treatment, 
but on the other hand they still disapprove euthanasia and 
decry suicide, even though the latter has been granted 
legal status. 
Euthanasia, in actual fact, is being decriminalized as 
suicide has already been. By such voluntary decisions, 
such free choices, the effect is that the costs of medical 
treatment are being reduced. That is the way they should 
be reduced, not by picking out the elderly to be finished off 
no matter what their personal health might be like-just 
because they are old. 
To arrange to have the elderly die because they cannot 
get medical help due to a purposive lack of funds is a policy 
of involuntary euthanasia. Ethically it is ignoble, just as 
voluntary dying can be noble and right, depending on the 
situation and without invidious distinction. 
*None of this is inconsistent with the fact that triage selections 5 
are sometimes necessary. This is a heart-breaking choice 
situation due not to policy but to insufficiences of supplies which 
come about for various reasons, not intended or wanted. 
6 
A RESPONSE TO FLETCHER 
by Daniel Callahan 
The Hastings Center 
Joseph Fletcher has written a sensitive and thoughtful 
response to my book. However, I think it simply begs the 
various questions I am trying to raise, rather than respond-
ing to them. 
First, Professor Fletcher seems to think that the entitle-
ment program for the elderly should be an open-ended one, 
regardless of how much that might cost, or regardless of the 
burden upon other age groups. How can that possibly be 
fair or reasonable, particularly if the costs really mount to 
enormously high proportions? How could we offer any age 
group an unlimited, infinite kind of entitlement? A recent 
study by the Urban Institute in Washington indicated that 
we could be looking at deficits in the present Medicare 
program of well over$1 00 billion ayear, sometime between 
the year 201 0 and 2020. We are already having a national 
crisis over a total national deficit in the vicinity of $150 
billion. How could we afford to have a deficit over $100 
billion for one program alone? 
Second, an entitlement program based on trying to meet 
individual need and individual desire, however unlimited, 
seems to me to go much too far. We simply do not know, 
in the face of contemporary medicine, how to find a fixed 
notion of what individuals need-the standards constantly 
escalate, driven by social desire, technological possibility, 
and the availability of funding. There is no such thing as a 
fixed need, but it is subject to social construction and social 
variability. To say, then, that we must meet all needs of the 
elderly is to simply pledge ourselves to a kind of demand 
that would be unfair to meet, and that we would grant to no 
other age group. 
Third, it seems to me to introduce an enormous confusion 
into our public debate to talk about a limitation of an entitle-
ment program as "involuntary euthanasia." By that stan-
dard, all of those who live now between the ages of 1 and 
64, who have no entitlement program at all, are being sub-
jected to "involuntary euthanasia" when they lack medical 
resources. For a society that is increasingly going to have 
to set medical limits, it would create an enormous muddle 
to call every decision to set a limit-or to engage in triage-
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as involuntary euthanasia, or euthanasia of any kind. 
Would that include the legislator who decided that it was 
more important to vote, say, for housing rather than health 
care? That kind of decision happens all the time, and no 
one has ever thought of calling it a form of euthanasia. ------------------------~(~ 
"How could we offer any age group 
an infinite kind of entitlement?" 
What I am proposing for the very distant future-20-30 
years from now-cannot be very happy, and could not 
possibly be ideal (though I do believe that our quest for 
endless life-extension for the elderly and all other groups is 
not good for them in any case). We are going to have to 
draw lines somewhere, and we are going to have to make 
certain that one age group-which will fairly soon be my 
own-is not allowed to take the funds needed by other age 
groups. We should all be prepared to make sacrifices for 
each other, but the aged are in a historically unique situ-
ation-they are on the frontier of an endless medical 
horizon, where we could simply spend more and more 
money, but not necessarily improve human life, and do so 
at the expense of the needs of other age groups, and the 
rest of society more generally. 
HOW OLD IS TOO OLD? 
by David Larson 
Lorna Linda University 
When it comes to qualifying for a transplanted organ ~ 
any other expensive medical resource, how old is too old, 
One plausible answer is that a patient is too old for an 
expensive medical resource whenever it probably cannot 
extend his or her own autobiography for an additional year 
or so. Patients and their families should be free to purchase 
with their own funds any therapy they desire providing this 
liberty does not unfairly affect other recipients. But society 
does not seem to possess a moral obligation to finance all 
such therapies through governmental programs. 
Efficiency and Morality 
Some doubt that health professionals should highlight a 
patient's age when allocating expensive medical resources. 
Their concerns are not wholly misplaced. Our society often 
values the young more than the old in ethically capricious 
ways. Age can also be a medically arbitrary standard, as 
evidenced by the greater willingness of some surgeons to 
transplant organs into older patients now that these physi-
cians themselves are older. Using age as a criterion can 
even deteriorate into a mindless process that allows doc-
tors and others to make difficult decisions without wrestling 
with the complexities of each situation on a case by case 
basis. 
But one important argument in favor of considering age 
when allocating expensive medical resources is that it is 
often inefficient and therefore immoral not to do so. Accord-
ing to basic economic thought, any distribution is efficier 
if it cannot be changed so as to enable one individual \.... 
receive more without thereby causing another to receive 
less. To divide an apple pie, for instance, so that some 
receive more than they can eat and therefore others 
receive less than they desire is inefficient even if no one 
goes without. 
Such inefficiency may be unpleasant when hosts allo-
~ate apple pie. It is unethical when professionals allocate 
;hedical resources because it is one thing to cause a guest 
'to forego dessert and another thing to cause a patient to 
forfeit life. This happens when a patient dies because an 
expensive medical resource was wasted upon another 
patient who was too old to benefit from it. The immorality 
of such inefficiency is evident by the fact that we would not 
choose to die so that a life-saving resource could be 
squandered on someone who could not benefit from it. "Do 
unto others," the Golden Rule declares, "as you would have 
them do unto you." 
Chronological Age and Medical Age 
Many objections to highlighting age evaporate when it is 
stipulated that medical age matters more than chronologi-
cal age. One way to distinguish the two is to specify that 
chronological age is retrospective and focused and medi-
cal age is prospective and comprehensive. To determine 
a patient's chronological age, one counts backward as 
accurately as possible to his or her birth in a tally of elapsed 
time. To determine a patient's medical age, one counts 
forward as accurately as possible to his or her death taking 
all factors into consideration. Twins, for instance, can 
exhibit similar chronological ages but very different medical 
ages. 
"The moral purpose of medicine is to 
" nable patients to extend and enrich 
, the stories of their own lives. " 
It is more difficult by far in many circumstances to 
calculate medical age than chronological age as these 
terms are used here. This difficulty is one reason why 
Daniel Callahan, The Hastings Center's director, rejects 
medical age, as presently defined, as an appropriate stan-
dard. Callahan rightly discerns how medically difficult and 
morally vexing such case-by-case forecasts can be. 
The ethically decisive factor, however, is not how long an 
individual has lived but how long he or she can be expected 
to live as a person. A patient's temporal nearness to his or 
her birth is of medical and moral interest only as it relates, 
along with other factors, to the temporal nearness of his or 
her death. If all other factors are about equal, and if both 
twins cannot be served, the expensive medical resource 
should be provided to the sibling who is younger medically 
even though they are virtually the same age chronologi-
cally. If the difference in their medical ages is great, it would 
be inefficient and therefore wrong to do otherwise. 
Biological Life and Autobiographical Life 
It is also inefficient and therefore immoral to bestow 
costly medical resources upon a patient whose subsequent 
quantity and quality of life will be meaningless to him or her. 
The difference between biological life and autobiographical 
) fe is the difference between the capacity to breathe and 
, 'circulate one's own blood and the capacity to think and to 
choose as well. The moral purpose of medicine is to enable 
patients to extend and enrich the stories of their own lives 
by enabling them to think and to choose for themselves. 
Whenever a patient is so old medically that there is no 
realistic hope of lengthening his or her own autobiography 
significantly, taxpayers have no moral obligation to finance 
expensive medical interventions. 
"It is not necessary that the final 
chapter in the patient's own story 
of his or her life be 'happy;' it is 
essential that it somehow makes a 
difference in his or her own auto-
biography_ " 
It is not necessary that the final chapter in the patient's 
own story of his or her life be "happy," "fun," "free of pain," 
or "productive" and "useful." But it is essential that the 
patient's additional time matters to him or her, that it 
somehow makes a difference in his or her own autobiogra-
phy. The burden of proof rests with those who doubt that 
an expensive medical resource can benefit a particular 
patient in this way. This requirement can be met, however. 
When it is, medicine should attempt to provide comfort and 
nothing more. 
How long must the additional chapter in the patient's 
autobiography be in order to merit the costly medical 
measures that enable it? Every answer to this question is 
a guess. Few would doubt the folly of spending a fortune 
in order to enable a patient to live another day. And few 
would doubt the wisdom of spending a dime in order to 
enable him or her to live another decade. The suggestion 
that society is obliged to finance expensive medical meas-
ures only if they extend a patient's autobiographical life 
another year or so is a frank and clumsy compromise 
between such extremes. There is nothing fixed about this 
compromise except the intent to strike in a public wayan 
appropriate balance between medical costs and benefits 
from the patient's own point of view. 
It is always necessary for members of society to care. It 
is not always mandatory that they finance cures through 
governmental programs. Indeed, it can be inefficient and 
therefore unethical for society to do so whenever a patient 
is medically so old, whatever his or her chronological age, 
that an expensive therapeutic resource cannot lengthen his 
or her autobiographical life for at least another year or so. 
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BOOK REVIEW 
Metaphors and Medicine 
( 
Those familiar with works in biomedi-
cal ethics might be surprised by William 
May's work, The Physician's Covenant: 
Images of the Healer in Medical Ethics 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1983). 
The reader does not find the usual list of 
rules and principles applied to the usual 
list of moral dilemmas. Instead, he finds 
a rich exercise in moral imagination. 
By examining principal metaphors that 
tend to shape understandings of the 
physician's professional role, May hopes 
to offer a "corrective vision" of the prac-
tice of medicine. The result is a wonder-
fully readable and informative book. 
One by one, May takes up the meta-
phors for the physician that "pervade our 
ordinary behavior and speech." Such 
metaphors are not mere decorations of 
language; they have the power to affect 
moral perception. They structure the 
"basic script" with which people act out 
their lives. Moral rules or principles may 
provide guidance in unusual circum-
stances, but basic metaphors give a far 
more "comprehensive ordering of life." 
The images that May finds less than 
adequate are the physician as "parent," 
"fighter," "technician," and "contractor." 
These metaphors are not mere foils to be 
discarded in favor of the images that are 
deemed superior: the physician as "faith-
ful covenant keeper" and as "teacher." 
Each of the inferior images, however, 
though it may somewhat distort moral 
vision, still highlights important moral 
realities. 
For example, the physician as "par-
ent"-the traditionally dominant image 
of the healing role-may support the 
overriding of competent patients' deci-
sions and thus deteriorate into harmful 
paternalism. Still, at its best, the parental 
image is useful. Like a good parent, the 
good healer exhibits compassion, nur-
ture, and care. 
By Gerald R. Winslow 
At the heart of May's own vision for 
medicine is his argument for the superi-
ority of a covenantal ethic. Although he 
acknowledges that his model of cove-
nant has many roots, including the Hip-
pocratic tradition, it draws most heavily 
on biblical imagery. The Bible includes 
many types of covenants, but all of these 
are secondary to that "singular covenant 
which embraces all others, the covenant 
of the people with God." 
The biblical model of covenant has 
three main features: (1) the giving and 
receiving of a gift that precedes (2) the 
exchange of promises of fidelity, and (3) 
the acceptance of a set of distinctive 
tive." It is tempting to wonder about the 
prospects of theconvenantal metaphor 
in our transient, secular, impersonal, and 
pluralistic society. A corrective vision, I 
suppose, must imagine the world the 
way it should be. But does the image of 
covenant faithfulness ask us to long for a 
world that used to be but will not return-
a close-knit, communal world of people 
who belonged to each other? Is the 
seemingly nostalgic image of covenant 
suitable in a society of strangers? How 
much help does it provide in resolving, 
for example, the very difficult questions 
of social justice occasioned by the 
enormous benefits and burdens of 
"Medicine as covenant fidelity faces stiff competition 
from an upstart-the physician as producer of goods. " 
moral obligations. So God delivered the 
people from Egypt (the gift); vows of 
fidelity were exchanged at Sinai (the 
promises); finally, the people accepted 
the ritual and moral obligations that were 
to govern their lives (the commands). 
May applies this model to the work of 
the physician. The physician's covenant 
with his or her patients and the larger 
community stems, first of all, from the 
receipt of gifts. The physician has re-
ceived his or her medical education from 
the community. What is more, the phy-
sician is indebted to those patients who 
have served as "teaching material." 
Finally, the physician is indebted to all of 
his or her patients because they provide 
the opportunity to practice medicine. So 
the physician is first beneficiary, then 
benefactor. And in the resultant cove-
nantal ethic, the physician responds to 
the fact that he or she has already been 
the recipient of gracious gifts. 
May's vision is, to be sure, "correc-
modern medicine as they are allocated 
by a complex society? If metaphors 
have power not only to disclose but also 
to obscure morally significant features of 
human existence, what might the meta! 
phor of covenant hide? 
It seems clear that medicine as cove-
nant fidelity faces stiff competition from 
an upstart-a metaphor not discussed 
by May that now bids fare to dominate 
American medicine: the physician as 
producer of goods for the health care 
"industry." More than a single metaphor, 
this is an entire system. In it, health care 
is a product to be marketed. Keyexpres-
sions include "market driven," "market 
share," "case mix," and, of course, the 
"bottom line." Only a little historical re-
flection would enable us to realize how 
different this representation of medicine 
is from what was once called the "minis-
try of healing." Given this new industrial, 
big-corporation image for medicine, 
maybe the metaphor and reality of cove-
nant is worthy of reconsideration. 
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